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Quantum Bayesian implementation
Abstract
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incom-
plete information. A recent work [Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat “bad”
social choice rules. Intl. J. of Quantum Information 9 (2011) 615-623] generalized the im-
plementation theory with complete information to a quantum domain. In this paper, we
propose a quantum Bayesian mechanism and an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, which
amend the traditional results for Bayesian implementation.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design is an important branch of economics. Compared with game the-
ory, it concerns a reverse question: given some desirable outcomes, can we design
a game that produces them? Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation
are two key topics of the mechanism design theory. The former assumes complete
information among the agents, whereas the latter concerns incomplete information.
Maskin [1] provided an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that
are Nash implementable when the number of agents is at least three. Postlewaite
and Schmeidler [2], Palfrey and Srivastava [3], and Jackson [4] together constructed
a framework for Bayesian implementation.
In 2011, Wu [5] claimed that the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
shall be amended by virtue of a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this amendment
holds in the macro world by virtue of an algorithmic mechanism [6]. Given these
accomplishments in the field of Nash implementation, this paper aims to investigate
what will happen if the quantum mechanism is applied to Bayesian implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries of
Bayesian implementation given by Serrano [7]. In Section 3, a novel condition,
multi-Bayesian monotonicity, is defined. Section 4 and 5 are the main parts of this
paper, in which we will propose quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms
respectively. The last section draws the conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A = {a1, · · · , ak} be a finite
set of social outcomes. Let Ti be the finite set of agent i’s types, and the private
information possessed by agent i is denoted as ti ∈ Ti. We refer to a profile of types
t = (t1, · · · , tn) as a state. Consider environments in which the state t = (t1, · · · , tn)
is not common knowledge among the n agents. We denote by T the set of states
compatible with an environment, i.e., a set of states that is common knowledge
among the agents. Let T =
∏
i∈N Ti. Each agent i ∈ N knows his type ti ∈ Ti, but
not necessarily the types of the others. We will use the notation t−i to denote (t j) j,i.
Similarly, T−i =
∏
j,i T j.
Each agent has a prior belief, probability distribution, qi defined on T . We make
an assumption of nonredundant types: for every i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, there exists
t−i ∈ T−i such that qi(t) > 0. For each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability
of t−i ∈ T−i, given ti, is the posterior belief of type ti and it is denoted qi(t−i|ti). For
simplicity, we shall consider only single-valued rules, i.e., an SCF f is a mapping
f : T 7→ A. Let F denote the set of SCFs. Given agent i’s state ti and utility
function ui(·, t) : ∆ × T 7→ R, the conditional expected utility of agent i of type ti
corresponding to a social choice function (SCF) f : T 7→ ∆ is defined as:
Ui( f |ti) ≡
∑
t′−i∈T−i
qi(t′−i|ti)ui( f (t′−i, ti), (t′−i, ti)).
An environment with incomplete information is a list E =< N, A, (ui,Ti, qi)i∈N >.
An environment is economic if, as part of the social outcomes, there exists a private
good (e.g., money) over which all agents have a strictly positive preference. Two
SCFs f and h are equivalent ( f ≈ h) if f (t) = h(t) for every t ∈ T .
Consider a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) imposed on an incomplete information envi-
ronment E, g : M 7→ F . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ is a profile of strategies
σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈N where σ
∗
i : Ti 7→ Mi such that for all i ∈ N and for all ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(g(σ∗)|ti) ≥ Ui(g(σ∗−i, σ′i)|ti), ∀σ′i : Ti 7→ Mi.
Denote by B(Γ) the set of Bayesian equilibria of the mechanism Γ. Let g(B(Γ))
be the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes. An SCF f is Bayesian imple-
mentable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) such that g(B(Γ)) ≈ f . An
SCF f is incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct
mechanism associated with f , i.e., if for every i ∈ N and for every ti ∈ Ti,∑
t′−i∈T−i
qi(t′−i|ti)ui( f (t′−i, ti), (t′−i, ti)) ≥
∑
t′−i∈T−i
qi(t′−i|ti)ui( f (t′−i, t′i ), (t′−i, ti)),
∀t′i ∈ Ti.
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Consider a strategy in a direct mechanism for agent i, i.e., a mapping αi = (αi(ti))ti∈Ti :
Ti 7→ Ti. A deception α = (αi)i∈N is a collection of such mappings where at least
one differs from the identity mapping. Given an SCF f and a deception α, let [ f ◦α]
denote the following SCF: [ f ◦ α](t) = f (α(t)) for every t ∈ T . For a type ti ∈ Ti,
an SCF f , and a deception α, let fαi(ti)(t
′) = f (t′−i, αi(ti)) for all t
′ ∈ T . An SCF f is
Bayesian monotonic if for any deception α, whenever f ◦ α 0 f , there exist i ∈ N,
ti ∈ Ti, and an SCF y such that
Ui(y ◦ α|ti) > Ui( f ◦ α|ti), while Ui(yαi(ti)|t′i ) ≤ Ui( f |t′i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti. (*).
In economic environments, the sufficient and necessary conditions for full Bayesian
implementation are incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity. To facili-
tate the following discussion, here we cite the Bayesian mechanism (Page 404, line
4, [7]) as follows: Consider a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g), where Mi = Ti×F ×Z+,
and Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. Each agent is asked to report his type ti,
an SCF fi and a nonnegative integer zi, i.e., mi = (ti, fi, zi). The outcome function g
is as follows:
(i) If for all i ∈ N, mi = (ti, f , 0), then g(m) = f (t), where t = (t1, · · · , tn).
(ii) If for all j , i, m j = (t j, f , 0) and mi = (t′i , y, zi) , (t
′
i , f , 0), we can have two
cases:
(a) If for all ti, Ui(yt′i |ti) ≤ Ui( f |ti), then g(m) = y(t′i , t−i);
(b) Otherwise, g(m) = f (t′i , t−i).
(iii) In all other cases, the total endowment of the economy is awarded to the agent
of smallest index among those who announce the largest integer.
3 Multi-Bayesian monotonicity
Definition 1: An SCF f is multi-Bayesian monotonic if there exist a deception α,
f ◦ α 0 f , and a set of agents Nα = {i1, i2, · · · } ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |Nα| ≤ n, such that for
every i ∈ Nα, there exist ti ∈ Ti and an SCF yi ∈ F that satisfy:
Ui(yi ◦ α|ti) > Ui( f ◦ α|ti), while Ui(yiαi(ti)|t′i ) ≤ Ui( f |t′i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti. (**).
Let l = |Nα|. Without loss of generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among
n agents.
In 1993, Matsushima [9] claimed that Bayesian monotonicity is a very weak condi-
tion when utility functions are quasi-linear and lotteries are available. Consider an
SCF f that satisfies Bayesian monononicity, if there is a deception α such that its
corresponding agent i has another symmetric agent j (i.e., i , j, ui = u j, Ti = T j,
the prior belief and posterior belief hold by them are the same), then f is multi-
Bayesian monotonic.
Example 1: Similar to Example 23.B.5 in Ref. [8], here we consider an auction
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setting with one seller (i.e., agent 0) and three buyers (i.e., agent 1, 2 and 3). All
buyers’ privately observed valuations ti are drawn independently from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1] and this fact is common knowledge among the agents. Each
buyer submits a sealed bid, bi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, 3). The sealed bids are examined and
the buyer with the highest bid is declared the winner. If there is a tie, the winner is
chosen randomly. The winning buyer pays an amount equal to his bid to the seller.
The losing buyer does not pay anything.
Consider the social choice function f (t) = (x0(t), x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), p0(t), p1(t), p2(t),
p3(t)), in which
x1(t) = 1, if t1 ≥ t2 and t1 ≥ t3; = 0 otherwise;
x2(t) = 1, if t2 > t1 and t2 ≥ t3; = 0 otherwise;
x3(t) = 1, if t3 > t1 and t3 > t2; = 0 otherwise;
x0(t) = 0, for all t;
p1(t) = −23θ1x1(t);
p2(t) = −23θ2x2(t);
p3(t) = −23θ3x3(t);
p0(t) = −[p1(t) + p2(t) + p3(t)].
It can be easily checked that the strategies bi(ti) = 23 ti (for i = 1, 2, 3) constitute
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this auction that indirectly yields the outcomes
specified by f (t). Thus, according to Theorem 1 [4], f is incentive compatible and
Bayesian monotonic. Since the three buyers are symmetric, then according to the
definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity, f is multi-Bayesian monotonic.
Proposition 1: In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive com-
patible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then f ◦ α is
not Bayesian implementable by using the traditional Bayesian mechanism, where
α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity.
Proof: According to Serrano’s proof (Page 404, line 33, [7]), all equilibrium strate-
gies fall under rule (i), i.e., f is unanimously announced and all agents announce
the integer 0. Consider the deception α specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian
monotonicity. At first sight, if every agent i ∈ N submits (αi(ti), f , 0), then f ◦ α
may be generated as the equilibrium outcome by rule (i). However, For each agent
i ∈ Nα, he has incentives to unilaterally deviate from (αi(ti), f , 0) to (αi(ti), yi, 0)
in order to obtain yi ◦ α by rule (ii.a). This is a profitable deviation for each agent
i ∈ Nα. Therefore, f ◦ α is not Bayesian implementable. 
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4 A quantum Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [5], here we will propose a quantum Bayesian mechanism to modify
the sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation. According to Eq (4) in Ref.
[10], two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn from the set:
ωˆ(θ, φ) ≡
eiφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
 , (1)
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, Jˆ ≡ cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗n + i sin(γ/2)σˆ⊗nx (where
γ ∈ [0, pi/2] is an entanglement measure, σx is Pauli matrix), Iˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, 0), Dˆn ≡
ωˆ(pi, pi/n), Cˆn ≡ ωˆ(0, pi/n).
Without loss of generality, we assume that:
1) Each agent i has a quantum coin i (qubit) and a classical card i. The basis vectors
|C〉 = (1, 0)T , |D〉 = (0, 1)T of a quantum coin denote head up and tail up respec-
tively.
2) Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation on his/her own
quantum coin. The set of agent i’s operation is Ωˆi = Ωˆ. A strategic operation cho-
sen by agent i is denoted as ωˆi ∈ Ωˆi. If ωˆi = Iˆ, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |C〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |D〉; If
ωˆi = Dˆn, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |D〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |C〉. Iˆ denotes “Not flip”, Dˆn denotes “Flip”.
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The information writ-
ten on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card i is denoted as card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)). A
typical card written by agent i is described as ci = (card(i, 0), card(i, 1)), where
card(i, 0), card(i, 1) ∈ Ti × F × Z+. The set of ci is denoted as Ci.
4) There is a device that can measure the state of n coins and send messages to the
designer.
A quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ) describes a strategy set Σˆi = {σˆi :
Ti 7→ Ωˆi ×Ci} for each agent i and an outcome function gˆ : ⊗i∈NΩˆi ×∏i∈N Ci 7→ F .
A strategy profile is σˆ = (σˆi, σˆ−i), where σˆ−i : T−i 7→ ⊗ j,iΩˆ j×∏ j,i C j. A Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of ΓQB is a strategy profile σˆ
∗ = (σˆ∗1, · · · , σˆ∗n) such that for every
i ∈ N and for every ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(gˆ(σˆ∗)|ti) ≥ Ui(gˆ(σˆ∗−i, σˆ′i)|ti), ∀σˆ′i : Ti 7→ Ωˆi ×Ci.
The setup of the quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ) is depicted in Fig.
1. The working steps of ΓQB are given as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents. Each agent i knows
ti and qi(t−i|ti). The state of each quantum coin is set as |C〉. The initial state of the
n quantum coins is |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
.
Step 2: If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then go to Step 4.
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Fig. 1. The setup of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. Each agent 
has a quantum coin and a card.  Each agent independently 
performs a local unitary operation on his/her own quantum coin. 
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Step 3: Each agent i sets ci = ((ti, fi, zi), (ti, fi, zi)), ωˆi = Iˆ. Go to Step 7.
Step 4: Each agent i sets ci = ((αi(ti), f , 0), (ti, fi, zi)) (where α is specified in the
definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Let n quantum coins be entangled by
Jˆ. |ψ1〉 = Jˆ|ψ0〉.
Step 5: Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation ωˆi on his/her
own quantum coin. |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]|ψ1〉.
Step 6: Let n quantum coins be disentangled by Jˆ+. |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+|ψ2〉.
Step 7: The device measures the state of n quantum coins and sends card(i, 0) (or
card(i, 1)) as mi to the designer if the state of quantum coin i is |C〉 (or |D〉).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and let the
final outcome gˆ(σˆ) = g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) specified in the traditional Bayesian
mechanism. END.
Given n ≥ 3 agents and an SCF f , suppose f satisfies multi-Bayesian monotonicity.
For each i ∈ Nα, let card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0), card(i, 1) = (αi(ti), yi, 0); for each i <
Nα, let card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0), card(i, 1) = (ti, fi, zi) (where α, Nα, yi are specified
in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). We define the payoff to the n-th
agent as follows: $C···CC represents the payoff to the n-th agent when the measured
state of n quantum coins in Step 7 of ΓQB is |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
; $C···CD represents the payoff
to the n-th agent when the measured state of n quantum coins is |C · · ·C︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
D〉). $D···DD
and $D···DC are defined similarly.
Definition 2: Given an SCF f satisfying multi-Bayesian monotonicity, define con-
dition λB as follows:
1) λB1 : Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $C···CC > $D···DD, i.e., he/she prefers the
expected payoff of a certain outcome (generated by rule (i)) to the expected payoff
of an uncertain outcome (generated by rule (iii)).
2) λB2 : Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $C···CC > $C···CD[1 − sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)] +
$D···DC sin2 γ sin2(pi/l).
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Proposition 2: In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive com-
patible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition
λB is satisfied, then f ◦α is Bayesian implementable by using the quantum Bayesian
mechanism.
Proof: Since f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then there exist a deception α, f ◦α 0
f , and 2 ≤ l ≤ n agents that satisfy Eq (**), i.e., for each agent i ∈ Nα, there exist
ti ∈ Ti and an SCF yi ∈ F such that:
Ui(yi ◦ α|ti) > Ui( f ◦ α|ti), while Ui(yiαi(ti)|t′i ) ≤ Ui( f |t′i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti.
Hence, the quantum Bayesian mechanism will enter Step 4. Each agent i ∈ N
sets ci = ((αi(ti), f , 0), (ti, fi, zi)). Let c = (c1, · · · , cn). Since condition λB is satis-
fied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in Ref. [5], if the n agents choose
σˆ∗ = (ωˆ∗, c), where ωˆ∗ = (Iˆ, · · · , Iˆ︸  ︷︷  ︸
n−l
, Cˆl, · · · , Cˆl︸      ︷︷      ︸
l
), then σˆ∗ ∈ B(ΓQB ). In Step 7, the cor-
responding measured state of n quantum coins is |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
. Hence, for each agent
i ∈ N, mi = (αi(ti), f , 0). In Step 8, gˆ(σˆ∗) = f ◦ α 0 f .
Therefore, f ◦ α is implemented by ΓQB in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
5 An algorithmic Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [6], in this section we will propose an algorithmic Bayesian mech-
anism to help agents benefit from the quantum Bayesian mechanism in the macro
world. In the beginning, we cite matrix representations of quantum states from Ref.
[6].
5.1 Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For a two-
level system, there are two basis vectors: (1, 0)T and (0, 1)T . In the beginning, we
define:
|C〉 =
10
 , Iˆ =
1 00 1
 , σˆx =
0 11 0
 , |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
=

1
0
· · ·
0

2n×1
(2)
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Jˆ = cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗n + i sin(γ/2)σˆ⊗nx (3)
=

cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2)
· · · · · ·
cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2)
i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2)
· · · · · ·
i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2)

2n×2n
(4)
For γ = pi/2,
Jˆpi/2 =
1√
2

1 i
· · · · · ·
1 i
i 1
· · · · · ·
i 1

2n×2n
, Jˆ+pi/2 =
1√
2

1 −i
· · · · · ·
1 −i
−i 1
· · · · · ·
−i 1

2n×2n
(5)
5.2 A simulating algorithm
Similar to Ref. [6], in the following we will propose a simulating algorithm that
simulates the quantum operations and measurements in Steps 4-7 of the quantum
Bayesian mechanism given in Section 4. The inputs and outputs of the algorithm
are adjusted to the case of Bayesian implementation. The factor γ is also set as its
maximum pi/2. For n agents, the inputs and outputs of the algorithm are illustrated
in Fig. 2. The Matlab program is given in Fig. 3, which is cited from Ref. [6].
Inputs:
1) θi, φi, i = 1, · · · , n: the parameters of agent i’s local operation ωˆi, θi ∈ [0, pi], φi ∈
[0, pi/2].
2) card(i, 0), card(i, 1), i = 1, · · · , n: the information written on the two sides of
agent i’s card, where card(i, 0), card(i, 1) ∈ Ti × F × Z+.
Outputs:
mi, i = 1, · · · , n: the agent i’s message that is sent to the designer, mi ∈ Ti ×F ×Z+.
Procedures of the algorithm:
Step 1: Reading parameters θi and φi from each agent i ∈ N (See Fig. 3(a)).
Step 2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn (See Fig.
8
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Fig. 2. The inputs and outputs of the algorithm. 
3(b)).
Step 3: Computing the vector representation of |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]Jˆpi/2|ψ0〉.
Step 4: Computing the vector representation of |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+pi/2|ψ2〉.
Step 5: Computing the probability distribution 〈ψ3|ψ3〉 (See Fig. 3(c)).
Step 6: Randomly choosing a “collapsed” state from the set of all 2n possible states
{|C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
, · · · , |D · · ·DD〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
} according to the probability distribution 〈ψ3|ψ3〉.
Step 7: For each i ∈ N, the algorithm sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) as mi to the
designer if the i-th basis vector of the “collapsed” state is |C〉 (or |D〉) (See Fig.
3(d)).
5.3 An algorithmic version of the quantum Bayesian mechanism
In the quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ), the key parts are quantum
operations and measurements, which are restricted by current experimental tech-
nologies. In Section 5.2, these parts are replaced by a simulating algorithm which
can be easily run in a computer. Now we update the quantum Bayesian mechanism
Γ
Q
B = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ) to an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism Γ˜B = ((Σ˜i)i∈N , g˜), which
describes a strategy set Σ˜i = {σ˜i : Ti 7→ [0, pi] × [0, pi/2] × Ci} for each agent i and
an outcome function g˜ : [0, pi]n × [0, pi/2]n ×∏i∈N Ci → F , where n ≥ 3, Ci is the
set of agent i’s card ci = (card(i, 0), card(i, 1)). A typical message sent by agent i
is denoted by (θi, φi, ti, fi, zi, t′i , f
′
i , z
′
i).
A strategy profile is σ˜ = (σ˜i, σ˜−i), where σ˜−i : T−i 7→ [0, pi]n−1 × [0, pi/2]n−1 ×∏
j,i C j. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ˜B is a strategy profile σ˜∗ = (σ˜∗1, · · · , σ˜∗n)
such that for any agent i ∈ N and for all ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(˜g(σ˜∗)|ti) ≥ Ui(˜g(σ˜∗−i, σ˜′i)|ti), ∀σ˜′i : Ti 7→ [0, pi] × [0, pi/2] ×Ci.
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Since the factor γ is set as its maximum pi/2, the condition λB in the quantum
Bayesian mechanism shall be updated as λBpi/2. λBpi/21 is the same as λ
B
1 ; λ
Bpi/2
2 is
revised as follows: Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $C···CC > $C···CD cos2(pi/l)+
$D···DC sin2(pi/l).
Working steps of the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism Γ˜B:
Step 1: Given an SCF f , if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, go to Step 3.
Step 2: Each agent i sends (ti, fi, zi) as mi to the designer. Go to Step 5.
Step 3: Each agent i ∈ Nα sets card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0), card(i, 1) = (αi(ti), yi, 0);
each agent i < Nα sets card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0), card(i, 1) = (ti, fi, zi) (where α, Nα,
yi are specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Then each agent
i submits θi, φi, card(i, 0) and card(i, 1) to the simulating algorithm.
Step 4: The simulating algorithm runs and outputs messages m1, · · · ,mn to the de-
signer.
Step 5: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and let the
final outcome be g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) of the traditional Bayesian mechanism.
END.
5.4 New results for Bayesian implementation
Proposition 3: In economic environments, given an SCF f that is incentive com-
patible and Bayesian monotonic:
1) If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition λBpi/2 is satisfied, then f ◦ α is
Bayesian implementable by using the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism.
2) If f is not multi-Bayesian monotonic, then f is Bayesian implementable.
Proof: 1) Since f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then Γ˜B enters Step 3.
Each agent i ∈ Nα sets card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0), card(i, 1) = (αi(ti), yi, 0); each
agent i < Nα sets card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0), card(i, 1) = (ti, fi, zi) (where α, Nα, yi
are specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Then each agent i
submits θi, φi, card(i, 0) and card(i, 1) to the simulating algorithm. Since condition
λBpi/2 is satisfied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Ref. [6], if the n agents
choose σ˜∗ = (σ˜∗i )i∈N , where for 1 ≤ i ≤ (n − l), θi = φi = 0; for (n − l + 1) ≤ i ≤ n,
θi = 0, φi = pi/l, then σ˜∗ ∈ B(˜ΓB)).
In Step 6 of the simulating algorithm, the corresponding measured state is |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
.
Hence, in Step 7 of the simulating algorithm, mi = card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0) for each
agent i ∈ N. Finally, in Step 5 of Γ˜B, g˜(σ˜∗) = g(m) = f ◦ α 0 f .
Therefore, f ◦ α is implemented by Γ˜B in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) If f is not multi-Bayesian monotonic, then Γ˜B is reduced to the traditional
Bayesian mechanism. Since the SCF f is incentive compatible and Bayesian mono-
tonic, then it is Bayesian implementable. 
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6 Conclusions
This paper follows the series of papers on quantum mechanisms [5,6], and gen-
eralizes the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5,6] to Bayesian im-
plementation. It can be seen that for n agents, the time complexity of quantum
and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms are O(n) and O(2n) respectively. Although
current experimental technologies restrict the quantum Bayesian mechanism to be
commercially available, for small-scale cases (e.g., less than 20 agents [6]), the
algorithmic Bayesian mechanism can help agents benefit from quantum Bayesian
mechanism just in the macro world.
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start_time = cputime
% n: the number of agents. For example, suppose there are 3 agents. N={1, 2, 3}.
% Suppose the SCF is incentive compatible, Bayesian monotonic and
%      multi-Bayesian monotonic.     ={1, 2, 3}. 
n=3;
% gamma: the coefficient of entanglement. Here we simply set gamma to its maximum        .
gamma=pi/2;
% Defining the array of     and                      .
theta=zeros(n,1);
phi=zeros(n,1);
% Reading agent 1’s parameters. For example,
theta(1)=0;
phi(1)=pi/3;
% Reading agent 2's parameters. For example, 
theta(2)=0;
phi(2)=pi/3;
% Reading agent 3’s parameters. For example, 
theta(3)=0;
phi(3)=pi/3;
)3/,0(ˆˆˆ 31 piωω == C
)3/,0(ˆˆˆ 32 piωω == C
i
θ ni
i
,,1, L=φ
Fig. 3 (a). Reading each agent i s parameters     and                     .
i
θ ni
i
,,1, L=φ
α
N
2/pi
3=l
)3/,0(ˆˆˆ 33 piωω == C
Fig. 3 (b). Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of
% Defining two 2*2 matrices
A=zeros(2,2);
B=zeros(2,2);
% In the beginning, A represents the local operation of agent 1. (See Eq (1))
A(1,1)=exp(i*phi(1))*cos(theta(1)/2);
A(1,2)=i*sin(theta(1)/2);
A(2,1)=A(1,2);
A(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(1))*cos(theta(1)/2);
row_A=2;
% Computing 
for agent=2 : n
% B varies from to
B(1,1)=exp(i*phi(agent))*cos(theta(agent)/2);
B(1,2)=i*sin(theta(agent)/2);
B(2,1)=B(1,2);
B(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(agent))*cos(theta(agent)/2);
% Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of C= A ⊗ B
C=zeros(row_A*2, 2);
for row=1 : row_A
C((row-1)*2+1, 1) = A(row,1) * B(1,1);
C((row-1)*2+2, 1) = A(row,1) * B(2,1);
C((row-1)*2+1, 2) = A(row,2) * B(1,2);
C((row-1)*2+2, 2) = A(row,2) * B(2,2);
end
A=C;
row_A = 2 * row_A;
end
% Now the matrix A contains the leftmost and rightmost columns of
1ωˆ
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
2ωˆ nωˆ
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Fig. 3 (c). Computing       ,      ,           .
% Computing 
psi2=zeros(power(2,n),1);
for row=1 : power(2,n)
psi2(row)=A(row,1)*cos(gamma/2)+A(row,2)*i*sin(gamma/2);
end
% Computing 
psi3=zeros(power(2,n),1);
for row=1 : power(2,n)
psi3(row)=cos(gamma/2)*psi2(row) - i*sin(gamma/2)*psi2(power(2,n)-row+1);
end
% Computing the probability distribution
distribution=psi3.*conj(psi3);
distribution=distribution./sum(distribution);
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ˆ ψψ += J
012
ˆ]ˆˆ[ ψωωψ J
n
⊗⊗= L
33 ψψ
2ψ 3ψ 33 ψψ
% Randomly choosing a “collapsed” state according to the probability distribution
random_number=rand;
temp=0;
for index=1: power(2,n)
temp = temp + distribution(index);
if temp >= random_number
break;
end
end
% indexstr: a binary representation of the index of the collapsed state
%   ‘0’ stands for      , ‘1’ stands for  
indexstr=dec2bin(index-1);
sizeofindexstr=size(indexstr);
% Defining an array of messages for all agents
message=cell(n,1);
% For each agent          , the algorithm generates the message
for index=1 : n - sizeofindexstr(2)
message{index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(index),',0)');
end
for index=1 : sizeofindexstr(2)
if indexstr(index)=='0' % Note: ‘0’ stands for  
message{n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),',0)');
else
message{n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),',1)');
end
end
% The algorithm sends messages                  to the designer
for index=1:n
disp(message(index));
end
end_time = cputime;
runtime=end_time – start_time
33 ψψ
i
mNi∈
n
mm ,,1 L
C D
C
Fig. 3 (d). Computing all messages                   . nmm ,,1 L
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